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With 2015 only eight years away, it is becoming clear 
that many countries in the developing world will not 
be able to meet the first Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG1) of halving absolute poverty. In fact, 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and several in 
Asia and Latin America are seriously off track for 
meeting that goal. In a large number of cases, this is 
related to poor growth performance that has made it 
difficult to reduce absolute poverty. In addition, in 
most of these countries, the growth they have been 
experiencing has had little impact on poverty. 
Moreover, rising inequality in many developing 
countries is further mitigating the impact of growth 
on poverty. Even in countries that are projected to 
meet MDG1 as a result of high growth (like China 
and India), rising inequality has sharply reduced the 
poverty impact of that growth, so that poverty is 
falling at unacceptably low rates. Given this situation, 
it is clearly insufficient to simply focus research and 
policy on the determinants of overall economic 
growth. Instead, it is critical to examine the 
determinants of pro-poor growth—that is, growth 
that has a particularly large impact on reducing 
poverty. This policy brief summarizes what is 
currently known about the definition, measurement, 
and determinants of such pro-poor growth, primarily 
drawing on results from a recently completed 
multidonor research program called Operationalizing 
Pro-Poor Growth, which was coordinated by the 
World Bank. 
Defining and Measuring Pro-Poor Growth 
There is a vibrant debate on different ways to 
conceptualize pro-poor growth. For some observers, 
growth is pro-poor if it leads to any reduction in 
poverty; for others, it is pro-poor only if it leads to a 
disproportionate increase in the incomes of the 
poor—that is, if it is associated with declining 
inequality. Although each of these views has merits, 
from a policy perspective, it is particularly useful to 
define pro-poor growth as growth that maximizes the 
income gains of the poor and thus accelerates 
progress toward meeting MDG1. Achieving high 
overall income growth can be one important way of 
achieving high income growth for the poor, but only 
if the poor are able to share in this growth. But even 
in such situations, the income growth of the poor will 
be higher if that growth is accompanied by pro-poor 
distributional change—in other words, a reduction in 
inequality. Such reductions in inequality immediately 
raise the incomes of the poor, and they have also 
been found to permanently increase the poverty 
impact of future growth and to help promote overall 
income growth in many circumstances. Thus, not 
only high and broad-based growth, but also pro-poor 
distributional change can be a powerful driver of pro-
poor growth.  
The growth incidence curve proposed by 
Ravallion and Chen is a particularly useful tool for 
tracking progress on pro-poor growth. They plot the 
growth rates of percentiles of the income 
distribution, which are lined up on the x-axis from 
poorest to richest. Figure 1 gives three examples—
Bangladesh, Romania, and Zambia—from the 
Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth case studies. 
Growth incidence curves (GICs) that are upward 
sloping suggest that the rich have benefited more 
from growth, as is the case for Bangladesh from 
1992 to 2000. Downward-sloping GICs suggest that 
the poor have benefited disproportionately from 
growth, as is the case for Zambia from 1991 to 1998. 
In Romania (1996–2002), all groups suffered 
declining incomes, but the rich more so than the 
poor. One way to summarize the information 
contained in the GIC is the rate of pro-poor growth 
proposed by Ravallion and Chen, which is simply the 
average of the growth rates for the percentiles below 
the poverty line (or graphically, the area under the 
GIC up until the poverty line in the first period). In 
the three examples shown, the difference between 
growth and pro-poor growth becomes apparent. In 
Bangladesh, overall annual per capita growth was 
1.8 percent, but the anti-poor nature of that growth 
meant that the rate of pro-poor growth was only 0.7 
percent. Conversely, in Zambia, overall per capita 
growth was negative (–1 percent), but pro-poor 
distributional change meant that the rate of pro-poor 
growth, at 1.1 percent, was actually higher than in 
Bangladesh. 
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Figure 1—Selected Growth Incidence Curves 
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Determinants of Pro-Poor Growth 
As the discussion so far has suggested, high rates of 
pro-poor growth can be achieved by generating high 
overall growth from which the poor benefit, by 
achieving pro-poor distributional change, or both. 
There is a large amount of literature examining the 
determinants of overall economic growth. The World 
Bank Growth Commission is currently distilling the 
most important policy messages from this literature. 
This brief focuses instead on the determinants of the 
distributional pattern of economic growth—that is, 
the difference between growth and pro-poor growth. 
Many of the determinants of pro-poor growth 
depend on country conditions, just as they do for 
growth. Thus, it is not easy to generalize policy 
messages that apply to all settings. Instead, pro-poor 
growth analysis should be seen as a toolbox for 
studying the country-specific determinants of growth 
and distributional change and for deriving country-
specific policy conclusions. One important outcome 
of the Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth project has 
been the development and application of such an 
analytical toolbox. 
Nonetheless, the cross-country analyses and 
country studies have generated some important 
policy messages that appear to be relevant beyond 
the specific country context. At the most general 
level, pro-poor growth will require growth that is 
focused on sectors where poor people are active (or 
could become active), on regions where poor people 
live (or could move to), and using production factors 
that poor people possess. In most poor developing 
countries, meeting these requirements will typically 
call for growth that includes the agricultural sector, 
that reaches rural areas and remote regions, and 
that is labor intensive. To the extent that poor 
people are able to diversify into nonfarm sectors or 
move to more dynamic regions, and to the extent 
that doing so would demonstrably enhance their  
incomes, the development of such sectors and 
regions could also support pro-poor growth, although 
the benefits are likely to be smaller and more indirect 
and occur with a time lag. Finally, pro-poor growth 
could be achieved through ex post pro-poor 
redistribution of the benefits from growth through 
the tax and transfer system. Although this approach 
is possible in principle and is a significant factor 
affecting pro-poor growth in developed countries, the 
ability of the tax and transfer systems in developing 
countries to achieve such ex post redistribution is 
much more limited and cannot generally be relied on 
to produce pro-poor outcomes. 
From these general principles, several more-
specific determinants of pro-poor growth have been 
derived, which are discussed below. 
Improved Productivity in the Food  
Crop Sector 
Productivity improvements in agriculture are a key 
determinant of pro-poor growth, particularly in 
countries where the poor are predominantly rural. 
Such productivity improvements require research and 
extension into better seeds and inputs, improved 
rural infrastructure, and improved access to credit. 
Although investments in cash crops can play a 
significant role in promoting pro-poor growth in some 
settings, productivity improvements in food crops are 
a more powerful driver of pro-poor growth, as the 
examples of China (particularly between 1978 and 
1985) and Indonesia show. Conversely, the 
experience of China since the mid-1980s 
demonstrates that even very high growth can lead to 
little further poverty reduction when that growth 
largely bypasses the agricultural sector. Similarly, the 
failure to achieve sustainable pro-poor growth in 
many African countries is closely related to the 
inability to generate lasting productivity 
improvements in the food crop sector. 
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Reduced Regional Inequality 
Improving the growth potential of lagging and 
remote regions is a second critical ingredient of  
a pro-poor growth agenda. Much of the observed 
increase in inequality in developing countries is  
due to rising regional inequality. Brazil, China, 
Ghana, India, and Vietnam are good examples in 
this regard. Such rising regional inequality 
increasingly undermines the ability of growth to 
have an impact on poverty. As a result, great 
attention must be placed on promoting growth in 
lagging regions. Among the policies to be pursued 
with greater vigor are infrastructure policies 
favoring lagging regions, targeted public 
investment programs and support for private 
investments there, support for migration and 
remittances, pro-poor fiscal decentralization 
measures that increase local public resources in 
poor regions, and specific safety nets such as 
conditional cash transfer programs focused on 
lagging regions. Ensuring success in this area is 
going to be one of the greatest challenges for pro-
poor growth policies. 
Improved Asset Base for the Poor 
Improving the asset base of the poor is another critical 
element in promoting pro-poor growth. In many 
countries, the most important asset base is the human 
capital of the poor. Developing countries have made 
considerable progress in expanding educational 
opportunities, but the poor are still lagging behind in 
terms of access to high-quality schooling, particularly 
beyond the primary level. Improving school quality and 
increasing the enrollment and retention of the poor can 
play important roles here. The positive educational 
impacts of conditional cash transfer programs are 
particularly relevant and worth emulating as ways to 
improve the educational opportunities of the poor and 
to reduce income inequality. It is also important to 
monitor the distributional pattern of educational 
achievements and investments more carefully than has 
been done to date. One way to do this is to generate 
growth incidence curves for education to examine the 
distributional impact of schooling investments. 
In countries where the poor in rural areas are 
landless or near landless, improving the asset base 
of the poor will also require greater access to land. 
Here speedy and effective land reform must be on 
the pro-poor growth agenda. Although market- 
based land reforms that support the poor in 
purchasing land on a willing buyer–willing seller  
basis can be part of a land reform strategy in 
countries such as Colombia or South Africa, this 
approach is usually insufficient to effect large-scale 
land redistribution where it is urgently required. In 
these cases, progressive land taxation might be an 
important tool to increase the available land for sale, 
and partly confiscatory land reform might be 
required, as was the case in many East Asian 
countries in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Reduced Gender Inequality 
In many countries, promoting pro-poor growth has 
an important gender dimension. Particularly in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, pro-poor growth is 
undermined by high gender inequality in education, 
access to resources at the farm level, and nonfarm 
employment. There is overwhelming evidence now 
that these inequalities not only hurt the females 
affected, but also reduce overall economic growth 
and thus poverty reduction. Conversely, investing in 
female education and employment has enabled 
countries to draw on their entire pool of talent for 
production and growth (rather than restricting the 
pool to males). It has also had indirect benefits for 
economic growth by, for instance, lowering fertility 
and population growth rates and improving the 
health and education of the next generation. The 
East Asian countries, for example, invested heavily in 
female education in the 1950s and 1960s and are 
now reaping the benefits in terms of female-
intensive, export-oriented growth strategies and a 
rapid demographic transition with drastically lowered 
dependency rates. The examples of Bangladesh, 
Botswana, and Tunisia in the 1990s show that such 
progress is also possible in South Asian and African 
settings. Interestingly, the impact of improved 
gender equity on pro-poor growth is related more to 
improving overall economic growth than to achieving 
pro-poor distributional change. 
Reduced Inequality for Disadvantaged  
Groups 
In some country contexts, promoting pro-poor 
growth will have to focus on other particularly 
disadvantaged groups. Often these groups are 
indigenous populations in Latin America, lower caste 
and tribal groups in South Asia, and ethnic minorities 
in East and Southeast Asia. Many of these groups 
suffer from multiple disadvantages, including a poor 
asset base, a remote location, a history of poverty, 
and ongoing discrimination. A pro-poor policy agenda 
in these countries will require an end to 
discrimination in education, labor, and credit markets 
and targeted initiatives to promote education and 
access to resources for these disadvantaged groups. 
Here the example of Malaysia’s policies of affirmative 
action has demonstrated the capacity to reduce 
historic inequalities without compromising high 
economic growth. 
Political Commitment to Pro-Poor Policies 
The promotion of pro-poor policies depends to a 
significant extent on political economy issues. The 
case studies on pro-poor growth reveal that a strong 
commitment of the political leadership to equity and 
poverty reduction is critical to implementing a 
consistent pro-poor policy agenda. Indonesia is a 
good example of how strong government 
commitment to poverty reduction and rural 
development over several decades was critical for 
the success of its pro-poor growth policies. Although 
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an open society with a tradition of public debates can 
do much to promote a pro-poor agenda, as has been 
the case in India (which recently introduced a 
national employment guarantee scheme, for 
example), the mere presence of regular elections 
does not necessarily ensure a pro-poor policy focus. 
A Strong State 
Finally, the research program on pro-poor growth 
showed that a strong state is needed to implement a 
pro-poor policy agenda. Although economic reforms 
and liberalization can play an important role in 
improving the incentives of the poor, these changes 
are usually insufficient in the face of market 
imperfections, poor infrastructure, poor endowments, 
and little access to productive inputs and credit. In 
these contexts, the improved border or capital city 
prices will not be transmitted to the farm gate, or 
farmers will lack the capital and technology to react 
to these improved opportunities. A strong state can 
effectively implement proactive policies to improve 
the productivity of the poor and increase their access 
to markets and productive inputs and credit. Thus  
a policy agenda for pro-poor growth must consider 
policies that were frowned on and dropped in the 
reform era of the 1980s and 1990s, such as state 
support for exporters, input subsidies, directed 
credit, regional and industrial policies, price 
regulation of goods produced or consumed by the 
poor, land reform, and redistributive taxation. Many 
of the East and Southeast Asian success stories of 
pro-poor growth (including early reform-era China, 
as well as Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia) used 
some or all of these measures to successfully 
promote growth and improve its distributional 
pattern. To be sure, in many other countries, similar 
policies were poorly implemented, were fiscally 
unsustainable, created new distortions, or were 
captured by narrow interest groups. A pro-poor 
growth agenda suggests that it is critical to learn 
from the successes and failures of such past 
interventionist policies and redesign future policies 
and their institutional setups accordingly. 
Concluding Remarks 
Economic growth in developing countries has 
recently accelerated across the board. Not only have 
high-growth economies such as China, India, and 
Vietnam been able to maintain their spectacular 
growth performance, but also growth has picked up 
in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and across 
Asia. From a pro-poor growth perspective, these 
generally positive trends carry two risks. First, much 
of the improvement in economic performance, 
particularly in Africa and parts of Latin America, are 
closely related to a boom in commodity prices that 
may be short lived or may lead to distortions in the 
economies and political systems of these countries. 
If and when the current commodity boom comes to 
an end, these distortions threaten to undermine the 
long-term growth potential of these countries. 
Second, in many countries, the high growth of the 
past 10 to 15 years has been accompanied by rising 
inequality, which slows the poverty impact of that 
growth. The pro-poor growth research has shown 
that this rise in inequality was not inevitable. In fact, 
a focus on the pro-poor policy agenda outlined here 
could ensure that growth is shared broadly among 
the population or, ideally, is accompanied by pro-
poor distributional change. The experiences of 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan also show 
that growth with equity is possible over long 
periods.  
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